Comparative Advantage, Learning, and Sectoral Wage Determination by Gibbons, Robert et al.
Montréal
Avril 2002
Série Scientifique
Scientific Series
    2002s-35
Comparative Advantage,
Learning, and Sectoral Wage
Determination
Robert Gibbons, Lawrence F. Katz,
 Thomas Lemieux, Daniel Parent
CIRANO
Le CIRANO est un organisme sans but lucratif constitué en vertu de la Loi des compagnies du Québec. Le
financement de son infrastructure et de ses activités de recherche provient des cotisations de ses organisations-
membres, d’une subvention d’infrastructure du ministère de la Recherche, de la Science et de la Technologie, de
même que des subventions et mandats obtenus par ses équipes de recherche.
CIRANO is a private non-profit organization incorporated under the Québec Companies Act. Its infrastructure and
research activities are funded through fees paid by member organizations, an infrastructure grant from the
Ministère de la Recherche, de la Science et de la Technologie, and grants and research mandates obtained by its
research teams.
Les organisations-partenaires / The Partner Organizations
•École des Hautes Études Commerciales
•École Polytechnique de Montréal
•Université Concordia
•Université de Montréal
•Université du Québec à Montréal
•Université Laval
•Université McGill
•Ministère des Finances du Québec
•MRST
•Alcan inc.
•AXA Canada
•Banque du Canada
•Banque Laurentienne du Canada
•Banque Nationale du Canada
•Banque Royale du Canada
•Bell Canada
•Bombardier
•Bourse de Montréal
•Développement des ressources humaines Canada (DRHC)
•Fédération des caisses Desjardins du Québec
•Hydro-Québec
•Industrie Canada
•Pratt & Whitney Canada Inc.
•Raymond Chabot Grant Thornton
•Ville de Montréal
© 2002 Robert Gibbons, Lawrence F. Katz, Thomas Lemieux et Daniel Parent. Tous droits réservés. All rights
reserved. Reproduction partielle permise avec citation du document source, incluant la notice ©.
Short sections may be quoted without explicit permission, if full credit, including © notice, is given to the source.
ISSN 1198-8177
Les cahiers de la série scientifique (CS) visent à rendre accessibles des résultats de recherche effectuée au
CIRANO afin de susciter échanges et commentaires. Ces cahiers sont écrits dans le style des publications
scientifiques. Les idées et les opinions émises sont sous l’unique responsabilité des auteurs et ne
représentent pas nécessairement les positions du CIRANO ou de ses partenaires.
This paper presents research carried out at CIRANO and aims at encouraging discussion and comment.
The observations and viewpoints expressed are the sole responsibility of the authors. They do not
necessarily represent positions of CIRANO or its partners.
Comparative Advantage, Learning, and
Sectoral Wage Determination1*
Robert Gibbons2, Lawrence F. Katz3, Thomas Lemieux4, and Daniel Parent5
 Résumé/Abstract
Dans cet article, nous cherchons à développer un modèle par lequel le salaire d'un
travailleur est fonction de ses qualifications. Le marché ainsi que le travailleur sont au
préalable dans l'incertitude quant à certaines de ces qualifications. L'endogénéité à la fois
des changements de salaire et des décisions de changements du secteur d'affiliation résulte
du processus d'apprentissage relié aux qualifications du travailleur. Nous montrons
ensuite comment le modèle peut être estimé par les méthodes des variables instrumentales
non-linéaires. Nous appliquons notre méthodologie à l'étude des salaires et de l'allocation
des travailleurs aux différentes occupations et industries. Nous trouvons que les secteurs à
salaires élevés emploient des travailleurs ayant davantage de qualifications et que ces
secteurs rémunèrent ces qualifications à un taux supérieur relativement aux secteurs à
faibles salaires. Les estimés des rendements associés aux qualifications qui ne tiennent
pas compte du fait que les rendements diffèrent d'un secteur à un autre sont par
conséquent erronés. Nous proposons enfin d'autres applications possibles de notre
méthodologie.
We develop a model in which a worker's skills determine the worker's current
wage and sector. Both the market and the worker are initially uncertain about some of the
worker's skills. Endogenous wage changes and sector mobility occur as labor-market
participants learn about these unobserved skills. We show how the model can be
estimated using non-linear instrumental-variables techniques. We then apply our
methodology to study the wages and allocation of workers across occupations and across
industries. For both occupations and industries, we find that high-wage sectors employ
high-skill workers and offer high returns to workers' skills. Estimates of these sectoral
wage differences that do not account for sector-specific returns are therefore misleading.
We also suggest further applications of our theory and methodology.
Mots-clés : avantages comparés, apprentissage, variables instrumentales
Keywords: comparative advantage, learning, non-linear instrumental variables
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1. Introduction
We analyze the theoretical and econometric implications of comparative advantage and
learning for the wages and sector affiliations of individuals, and for changes in these variables
over workers' careers. After developing the theory and econometrics, we turn to two empirical
applications of our methodology, concerning the wages and allocations of workers across
occupations and across industries.
Our focus on comparative advantage is motivated by a large and established literature.
Many have found that the average characteristics of individuals vary by sector.1 Furthermore,
several have found that the measured returns to individuals' observable characteristics vary by
sector.2 Finally, Heckman and Scheinkman (1987) rejected the hypothesis that the returns to
individuals' time-invariant unmeasured characteristics are constant across sectors.
Our focus on learning is motivated by a smaller and more recent literature. While
Jovanovic (1979), Harris and Holmstrom (1982), and others showed long ago that learning
models could provide new interpretations for important features of the data (such as the return to
seniority and the increase in the variance of wages with experience), recent work has built on
these foundations to derive and test novel implications, many of which have survived
confrontations with data.3
Our theoretical model emphasizes the role of worker skills that cannot be measured by an
econometrician. To clarify the exposition of the econometrics, we develop the theory in stages.
                                                          
1 For example, Dickens and Katz (1987) found differences in average education levels by industry and
Blackburn and Neumark (1992) found sorting by test scores across industries.
2 For example, Mincer and Higuchi (1988) found differences in returns to tenure and experience across
industries in Japan and the US and Freeman and Medoff (1984) found differences in returns to education and
experience for union and non-union workers.
3 For example, Farber and Gibbons (1996) derive and test the prediction that the residual from a regression
of an individual's score on an ability test (AFQT) on observable characteristics and the first wage should have
increasing explanatory power for subsequent wages as experience increases. Continuing in this vein, Altonji and
Pierret (2001) derive and test the prediction that the effect of observable characteristics (like education) should
decrease with experience while the effect of initially unobservable characteristics like AFQT (not only the AFQT
residual) should increase with experience. Chiappori, Salanié, and Valentin (1999) derive and test a new prediction
from the Harris-Holmstrom model, that comparing two individuals in the same job in period 1 and the same (higher)
job in period 3, future wage and promotion prospects are brighter for the individual who was promoted later (i.e., in
period 3 rather than period 2).
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We begin with two models in which workers' skills are equally valued in all sectors. In the first
of these models, all labor-market participants have perfect information about workers' skills; in
the second, information is initially imperfect but output observations convey additional
information over time and so endogenize wage changes. We then develop two other models in
which different sectors place different values on workers' skills and workers sort themselves into
different sectors on the basis of comparative advantage. In the first of these latter two models,
labor-market participants again have perfect information about workers' skills; in the second,
information is again imperfect, so learning endogenizes not only wage changes but now also
sector mobility.
Our richest model, with comparative advantage and learning, resembles the learning and
matching models of wages and turnover pioneered by Jovanovic (1979), Ross, Taubman, and
Wachter (1981), and MacDonald (1982). In Jovanovic's model, a worker's performance is
independent across jobs, whereas in our model (like Ross et. al. and MacDonald), a worker's
performance in one job determines not only the expected value of staying in that job but also the
expected value of moving to a given new job. We differ from Ross et. al. and MacDonald by
introducing a one-dimensional notion of ability that determines a worker's productivity in every
sector, much as in Murphy (1986). The resulting model of learning and sorting is a natural
generalization of the two-period, two-sector, two-type model in Gibbons and Katz (1992).
As is well known, in our simplest theoretical model (in which worker skills are equally
valued in all sectors and there is no learning by labor-market participants), the returns to time-
varying worker characteristics can be estimated using first-differences to eliminate individual
fixed effects that are unmeasured by the econometrician. Similarly, in this simplest model, first-
differences can be used to estimate sectoral wage differentials without bias from unmeasured
fixed effects. Unfortunately, first-difference estimation is not appropriate for any of the three
other theoretical models we develop. Simply put, in these models, a worker's fixed ability does
not translate into a fixed effect in a wage equation, so first-differencing the wage equation does
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not correct ability bias. The contribution of this paper is to move beyond merely warning of this
problem (as in Gibbons and Katz, 1992, for example) to proposing a solution.
Our theoretical models rely heavily on the assumption of normality. Many models that
rely on normality can be estimated by maximum likelihood or by two-step methods, but
estimating our dynamic model of wage determination and sector affiliation would be
computationally difficult because it entails more than two sectors and more than two periods. In
addition, it is not necessary to estimate the full model when the parameters of interest are those
that determine the returns to skills and wage differences across sectors. We therefore undertake
the more modest task of estimating the wage equations in each sector.4
We show that our richest theoretical model produces a random-coefficients econometric
model in a panel-data setting, which can be estimated using a non-linear instrumental-variables
technique. Even in this richest model, consistent estimates of the effects of both measured and
unmeasured skills on wages require neither distributional assumptions nor standard exclusion
restrictions. (That is, we use normal distributions to develop the full theory, but we do not need
these assumptions to estimate the parameters of interest related to sectoral wage differentials and
sector-specific returns to skills.) Instead, the estimation strategy utilizes natural restrictions
available in panel data with three or more observations per person. Our econometric approach is
similar to other panel-data models in which first-differenced estimates are inconsistent, such as
Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen (1988) and Lemieux (1998).
After developing the theory and econometrics, we implement two empirical
investigations, concerning sorting and wage differentials across occupations and industries, using
individual-level panel data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth. Our richest
theoretical model is consistent with several familiar facts about wage determination: a typical
individual's wage increases with experience, the variance of the wage distribution across
                                                          
4 Other results exist on the identifiability of related models in the absence of normality. For example,
Heckman and Honore (1990) show that the Roy model is identified with panel data and exogenous shifts in the price
of skills over time. But Heckman and Honore focus on the estimation of a sequence of static models; they do not
address learning and job mobility.
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individuals increases with experience, and the skewness of the wage distribution increases with
experience.5 But variants of Mincer's (1974) theory can also explain these basic facts, so we
focus on our model's further predictions, concerning the returns to skills and the resulting
allocation of workers across sectors. For both occupations and industries, we find important
variation in sector-specific returns to observed and unobserved skills. Furthermore, in both cases,
high-wage sectors employ high-skill workers and offer high returns to workers' skills, so
estimates of sectoral wage differences that do not account for sector-specific returns to skill and
the sorting of workers across sectors on the basis of unmeasured skills are misleading and
difficult to interpret.
Although our empirical work explores two standard definitions of sectors (namely,
occupations and industries), other definitions are possible. For example, sectors could be jobs
inside a firm (Gibbons and Waldman, 1999; Lluis, 2001), states or regions within a country
(Borjas, Bronars, and Trejo, 1992), or entire countries (Borjas, 1987). In fact, the individuals in
our model need not be workers. Instead, they could be firms, where what we call worker ability
is reinterpreted as firm productivity, much as Jovanovic (1982) reinterpreted Jovanovic (1979).
2. Theory and Econometrics
The four theoretical models analyzed below are special cases of the following model. If
worker i is employed in sector j at time t, the worker's output is
(1)yijt = exp(Xit bj + yijt),
where Xit is a vector of human-capital and demographic variables measured by the
econometrician and yijt represents determinants of productivity that are not measured by the
                                                          
5 An illustrative discussion of these implications of the model and a comparison with alternative labor market
models is presented in Neal and Rosen (2000).
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econometrician. The worker characteristics Xit and the slope vector bj are known by all labor-
market participants at the beginning of period t; the realized output yijt is observed by all labor-
market participants at the end of period t. The error term yijt has the components
(2) yijt = Zi + bj (hi + eijt ) + cj,
where Zi denotes the portion of worker i's productive ability that is equally valued in all sectors,
hi denotes the portion that is differentially valued across sectors, and eijt is a random error. The
coefficients {bj, cj : j = 1,...,J} are fixed and known to all labor-market participants. The noise
terms eijt are normal with zero mean and precision he (i.e., variance se2 = 1/he ) and are
independent of each other and of all the other random variables in the model.
In developing the theory and econometrics, we treat Zi and hi differently. We assume
throughout that Zi is observed by all labor-market participants; this is the standard case of a fixed
effect that the econometrician cannot observe but market participants can. For hi, however, we
consider two cases: perfect information (no learning by market participants, as with Zi) and
imperfect information (learning). One could also imagine investigating learning about Zi. Farber
and Gibbons (1996) study this problem in the absence of sector-specific returns to ability (i.e.,
bj=b and bj = b for every j, so that a worker's unmeasured ability is Zi + bhi and is equally valued
in every sector), but the combined problem of learning about Zi and about hi awaits future
research.
In the imperfect-information case, all labor-market participants share symmetric but
imperfect information about hi. In particular, given their initial information (Zi and Xi1), all
participants in the labor market share the prior belief that hi is normal with mean m and precision
h. Subsequent productivity observations, yijt , refine this belief. Information in the labor market
therefore remains symmetric and improves over time. For simplicity, we assume that subsequent
realizations of measured skills, Xit, are conditionally independent of hi given Zi and Xi1. (This
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assumption is not only convenient but realistic, because the major time-varying element of Xit is
experience.) Thus, market participants can compute
(3)  ,
which yields sit = hi + eijt, a noisy signal about the worker's ability that is independent of the
worker's sector during period t. We call sit the worker's normalized productivity observation for
period t. Let sit = (si1,..., sit) denote the history of the worker's normalized productivity
observations through period t. Then (from Chapter 9 of DeGroot, 1970) the posterior distribution
of hi given history sit is normal with mean
(4)
and precision ht = h + the.
To close the model, we assume that workers are risk-neutral and that there is no cost to
firms or workers at the beginning or end of a job (i.e., no hiring, firing, or mobility costs), so we
can restrict attention to single-period compensation contracts. For simplicity, we further restrict
attention to contracts that specify the period's wage before the period's production occurs (as
opposed to piece-rate contracts). Competition among firms causes each firm in a given sector to
offer a given worker a wage equal to the expected value of the worker's output in that sector,
given the worker's observed characteristics and history of previous output realizations.
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2.1 Sorting without Comparative Advantage
In this sub-section we ignore the possibility of comparative advantage by assuming that
bj=b for every j, so that a worker's unmeasured ability is Zi + bhi and is equally valued in every
sector. Continuing in this vein, we also assume in this section that bj = b for every j. But we
allow the intercepts cj to vary by sector, in keeping with the possibility that measured sector
premia may reflect true sector effects. Of course, all else constant, jobs in sectors with high
values of cj may be more attractive (depending on the source of cj , such as rent-sharing versus
compensating differentials). If some sectors are more attractive, issues such as queuing and
rationing arise. Because our main interest is in the richer model with comparative advantage in
Section 2.3, we do not formally address queuing or rationing here.
It is not controversial that workers' productive abilities are imprecisely measured in
standard micro data sets. But if unmeasured skills are to explain estimated sector wage
differentials then these skills must be non-randomly allocated across sectors. This, too, is
plausible, for example because different sectors use different technologies that require workers'
skills in different proportions. But if this unmeasured-skill explanation for measured sectoral
wage differentials is correct, it suggests that the few skills that are measured in standard micro
data sets (hereafter "measured skills") should be systematically related to the sector in which the
worker is employed. We investigate this prediction about measured skills in our empirical work
on occupations and industries in Sections 3 and 4. For now, however, we confine our attention to
econometric approaches to estimating the role of unmeasured skills.
In the perfect-information case without comparative advantage, all firms know that the
worker's ability is Zi + bhi. As always, the wage offered to worker i by firms in sector j in period
t is the worker's expected output in that sector, but the only uncertainty in this case is the error
term beijt in (2). Recall that if log q is normally distributed with mean m and variance s2 then
E(q) = exp{m + (1/2)s2}. Therefore the log wage offered to worker i in sector j in period t is
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(5) ln wijt = Xitb + Zi + bhi + cj + (1/2)b2se2 .
Turning to the imperfect-information case without comparative advantage, in each period, firms
in sector j bid worker i's wage up to the worker's expected output in that sector (conditional on
the publicly observable information available at that date), so the log wage is
(6) ln wijt = Xitb + Zi + bmi,t-1 + cj  + (1/2)b2st2 ,
where mi,t-1 is shorthand for mt-1(sit-1) and st2 = [h + the]/(he[h + (t-1)he]). In both the perfect- and
the imperfect-information cases, the worker's ability hi is unmeasured by the econometrician (as
is Zi); in the latter case, hi is also unobserved by labor-market participants (unlike Zi). Note that,
since t represents the number of years of experience in the model, the error component (1/2)b2st2
will be captured by a linear function in labor market experience that we include in all estimated
models.
2.2 Estimation without Comparative Advantage
In the absence of both learning and comparative advantage, the source of possible bias in
conventional cross-section estimates of sectoral log wage differentials is the potential partial
correlation between sector affiliation and unmeasured skills (Zi and hi) conditional on measured
skills (Xit). In this simplest case, the worker's fixed ability (Zi + bhi) creates a worker fixed-effect
in the wage regression, which can be eliminated in standard fashion. For example, a first-
differenced regression eliminates the fixed effect Zi + bhi in (5).
Even without comparative advantage, however, learning implies that fixed ability is not a
fixed effect in the earnings equation. The key property of our learning model is that Bayesian
beliefs are a martingale. That is, the conditional expectation mt(sit) in (4) obeys the law of motion
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(7) mit = mi,t-1 + xit,
where xit is a noise term orthogonal to mi,t-1. In somewhat more intuitive terms, the market begins
period t with the information contained in sit-1 and then extracts new information about hi from
the output observation yijt (or, equivalently, sit). But the new information that can be extracted
from yijt is precisely the part that could not be forecasted from sit-1. Hence, the innovation xit is
orthogonal to the prior belief mi,t-1.
Farber and Gibbons (1996) explored some of the implications of this martingale property.
But they focused on several specific predictions that can be derived regarding regressions in
which the dependent variable is the level of earnings, not the log of earnings. In this paper, in
contrast, we use the log of earnings as the dependent variable, so the specific Farber-Gibbons
predictions do not hold, but the martingale property of the market's beliefs continues to create
endogeneity problems, as follows.6
Formally, a first-differenced regression eliminates Zi but not mi,t-1 from (6). Instead, first-
differencing (6) for a worker who switches from sector j to sector j' yields
(8) ln wit - ln wi,t-1 = (Xit - Xi,t-1)b + b(mi,t-1 - mi,t-2) + (cj' - cj) + (1/2)b2(st2 - s2t-1)  ,
where mi,t-1 - mi,t-2 = xi,t-1. But xi,t-1 may be correlated with the change in sector affiliation through
whatever (unmodeled) process led unmeasured ability to be correlated with sector affiliation in
the first place.7 Thus, with learning, first-differenced estimates of sectoral wage differentials are
                                                          
6 Relative to Farber and Gibbons, we also use the more specific production function (1), the more specific
error structure (2), and the more specific distributional assumptions given in the text below (2). We impose these
more specific assumptions in order to explore several issues related to the returns to skills across sectors, which
Farber and Gibbons could not address with their more general model.
7 For example, suppose that there are only two levels of ability, high and low, but that sectors differ in the
proportion of high-ability workers they employ. Consider a high-ability worker whose employment exogenously
ends in sector j. Suppose that such a worker is equally likely to be re-employed in any of the economy's jobs for
high-ability workers. Then there is some probability that the worker's new job is again in sector j, but if the worker
changes sectors then it is likely that the new job is in a sector with a large number of high-ability jobs. In this case,
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biased if the change in the residual is correlated with the change in sector affiliation. Fortunately,
this endogeneity problem is simple to correct because the new information summarized in xi,t-1 is
not related to wage, skill, or sector information in period t - 1 or earlier. (See Section 2.4 for
more discussion of this issue.) For example, equation (8) can be estimated by two-stage least
squares using the interaction of the worker's score on an ability test (taken before the worker
entered the labor market) and the worker's sector affiliation at t-1 as a valid instrumental variable
for changes (between t - 1 and t) in sector affiliation.
2.3 Sorting with Comparative Advantage
In this section we relax the assumption that a worker's ability is equally valued in every
sector. By introducing comparative advantage, we endogenize sector affiliation. By subsequently
introducing learning, we endogenize not only wage changes but also sector mobility.
To analyze comparative advantage, we now return to the production function specified in
(1) and (2), where the slope coefficients bj in (1) and bj in (2) vary by sector. We index the J
sectors so that bj strictly increases in j: sector j + 1 values the worker's ability hi more than does
sector j. In keeping with the notion that ability is productive, we assume that b1 > 0. Given a
fixed Xit there exist critical values of hi that determine the efficient assignment of workers to
sectors. Denoting these critical values by {vj(Xit) : j = 0, 1,...,J}, the efficient assignment rule
assigns worker hi to sector j if and only if vj-1(Xit) < hi < vj(Xit), where v0(Xit) = -¥, vn(Xit) = ¥,
and vj(Xit) strictly increases in j. See Figure 1 for a graphical representation of this efficient
assignment rule.
We again analyze first perfect and then imperfect information. In the perfect-information
case, firms in sector j bid worker i's wage up to the expected output in that sector:
                                                                                                                                                                                          
positive information about a worker's ability will tend to be associated with shifts to high-wage sectors (where high-
skill jobs are more plentiful), and the reverse for negative information.
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(9) ln wijt = Xitbj + Zi + bjhi + cj + (1/2)bj2se2 ,
analogous to (5) but with the sector-specific returns bj and bj. If the worker faces no mobility
constraints, worker i will choose to work in sector j if vj-1(Xit ) < hi < vj(Xit). Thus, taking the
model literally, sector mobility in the perfect-information case is driven entirely by changes in
Xitbj. One could envision exogenous shocks to sector demand that produce additional sector
mobility in this model, but we will not formally model such shocks, for the same reason that we
did not model queues or rationing above: our ultimate interest is in the model with comparative
advantage and learning, which gives a coherent account of sectoral mobility without reference to
queues, rationing, or sectoral shocks. Whatever the reason that worker i is employed in sector j in
period t, in the perfect-information case with comparative advantage we assume that the worker's
wage is given by (9).
In the imperfect-information case, we again assume that information in the labor market
is symmetric but imperfect, as described above. As in the model of learning without comparative
advantage, all participants in the labor market share the prior belief that hi is normal with mean
m and precision h, conditional on their initial information Zi and Xi1. Inferences from the
productivity observations, yijt, are greatly simplified because the information content of an output
observation is constant across sectors; that is, (2) involves bj(hi + eijt) rather than bjhi + eijt. This
functional form is what allows us to define the normalized productivity observation for worker i
in period t, sit from (3), to be a noisy signal about the worker's ability that is independent of the
worker's sector during period t. Relaxing this assumption about the functional form of (2) would
complicate the analysis because workers' sector choices would then depend on the benefit from
faster learning as well as on the benefit from increased expected output given current beliefs.
Relaxing the assumption that all labor-market participants observe Zi (so that there could be
learning about both Zi and hi) would cause similar complications. Under our assumptions, the
posterior distribution of hi given the history sit is normal with mean mit given by (4) and
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precision ht = h + the, regardless of the worker's history of sector affiliations.
In this fourth model, with learning and comparative advantage, we finally have an
internally consistent account for sector affiliation, wages, sector mobility, and wage changes, as
follows. In each period, firms in sector j bid a worker's wage up to the worker's expected output
in that sector, conditional on the publicly observable information about the worker available at
that date:
(10) ln wijt = Xitbj + Zi + bjmi,t-1 + cj + (1/2)bj2st2,
analogous to (6) but with sector-specific returns bj and bj. The model also includes sector-
specific (experience) effects since the posterior variance st2, which declines with time (labor
market experience), is interacted with bj2.  The worker chooses to work in the sector offering the
highest current wage. Thus, worker i chooses sector j in period t+1 if vj-1(Xit ) < mit < vj(Xit).
2.4 Estimation with Comparative Advantage
We now develop a non-linear instrumental-variables procedure to estimate the parameters
{bj, bj, cj; j = 1,..., J} in (9) and (10). This procedure does not rely on normality and can be
implemented using standard computer packages. To discuss the estimation of the model, define
the sector indicators Dijt where:
Dijt = 1 if person i is employed in sector j at time t,
Dijt = 0 otherwise.
The wage equation (10) for each sector j can then be written as a single equation where
measurement error mit is assumed to be independent of sector affiliation:
(11) .
it
j
tjijt
j
tijijt
j
ijitijt
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Estimates of the sector slopes and intercepts {bj, cj; j = 1,..., J} obtained by estimating equation
(11) with OLS are inconsistent. The problem is that expected ability influences sector affiliation,
so mi,t-1 is correlated with the set of sector dummies {Dijt, j = 1,..., J}.
The endogeneity problem in equation (11) is different from the usual fixed-effect case for
two reasons. First, as noted in Section 2.2, mi,t-1 is a martingale rather than a fixed effect. This
martingale property does not depend on the normality assumptions in our theoretical model; all
Bayesian beliefs are martingales. In the absence of comparative advantage, we could handle this
martingale problem as described in Section 2.2. But, second, comparative advantage causes mi,t-1
to be interacted with the set of sector dummies {Dijt, j = 1,..., J} in (11).
Other panel-data models in which first-differenced estimates are inconsistent have been
considered in the literature. For example, Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen (1988) discuss the
estimation of models in which the fixed effect is interacted with year dummies. They show that
consistent estimates can be obtained by quasi-differencing the equation of interest and then using
appropriate instrumental-variables techniques. Similarly, Lemieux (1998) estimates a model in
which the return to a time-invariant unobserved characteristic is different in the union and the
nonunion sectors.
The estimation strategy we follow also relies on quasi-differencing combined with IV
techniques. More precisely, we eliminate mi,t-1 by exploiting the dynamic structure of the
problem, as follows. First, solving (11) for mi,t-1 yields:
(12) .
mi, t -1 =
ln w it - Dijtc j -
j
å Dijt X itb j -
j
å Zi - (1/2) Dijtb j2s t2 -
j
å mit
Dijtb j
j
å
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The lagged version of equation (12) yields an expression for mi,t-2. Substituting this expression
for mi,t-2 into the law of motion mi,t-1 = mi,t-2 + xi,t-1 gives a new expression for mi,t-1, which can be
substituted into the wage equation (11) to yield:
(13) ,
where  .
Equation (13) is a non-linear wage equation from which mi,t-1 has been eliminated. Non-
linear least-square estimates of the sector slopes and intercepts {bj, bj, cj; j = 1,..., J} are
nevertheless inconsistent for two reasons. First, the lagged version of equation (11) shows that ln
wi,t-1 is correlated with mi,t-1 by construction (but not with xi,t-1, which is unknown at the moment
wi,t-1 is decided). Second, the sector dummies Dijt are correlated with ni,t-1 because expected
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affiliation is determined only by perceptions about the sector-sensitive components of ability (Xit
and hi) and is independent of any part of ability that is not differentially valued across sectors
(Zi).  In Appendix B we discuss in more detail why the model suggests using these variables as
instruments.  We also show evidence of their predictive power.  For efficiency reasons discussed
below, we also include a set of interactions of sector affiliation at time t-2 with the explanatory
variables Xit (as summarized by a skill index and year of experience) in the instrument set.8
We estimate the parameters in equation (13) using non-linear instrumental-variables
(NLIV) techniques. Consider e, a vector in which all the individual error terms eit are stacked,
and V, a matrix in which the individual instrument vector vit (e.g., sector histories) are stacked.
Since the error terms e should be uncorrelated with the instruments V, the orthogonality
condition (1/N)e'V = 0 should hold. The NLIV method consists of setting the sample analogs of
(1/N)e'V as close as possible to zero by finding the values of the parameters cj, bj, and bj (for j =
1,..., J) that minimize the quadratic form
(14) S = (1/N) (e'V)M(e'V),
where M is a weighting matrix.  Note that the parameters {bj, bj, cj; j = 1,..., J} are implicitly
included in S because the elements eit of e are computed as the difference between ln wit and the
explanatory factors on the right-hand-side of equation (13). Under the assumption that eit is
homoskedastic and uncorrelated, it is well known that the most efficient estimate is obtained by
using the inverse of the variance of e'V as weighting matrix, M=(V'V)-1.  However, equation (13)
shows that eit is a relatively complex function of the sector dummies.  So eit will be
heteroskedatic even if the "structural" error terms xit and mit are homoskedastic.
                                                          
8 Since both the terms Xitbj and (1/2)bj2st2 are interacted with sector affiliation, which is endogenous, it is
natural to include some instruments for sector affiliation interacted with those terms in the instrument set.  In the
estimation we replace Xitbj by a skill index discussed below and use experience to proxy for st2.  This leads to
adding interactions between the second lag of sector affiliation (the instruments for sector affiliation) and the skill
index and experience to the main set of instruments (interactions between sector affiliation at t-1 and t-2).
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To allow for heteroskedasticity, we use a standard GMM two-step procedure in which the
parameters are first estimated using M=(V'V)-1.  These consistent but inefficient parameters are
used to compute a heteroskedasticity-robust variance matrix S of e'V.  Efficient GMM estimates
are then obtained using M=S-1.  Furthermore, it is easily shown (Hansen, 1982) that N times the
minimized value of S follows a c2 distribution with q degrees of freedom, where q is the number
of overidentifiying restrictions (the difference between the number of instruments and the
number of parameters).   In complicated non-linear models like ours, however, this
overidentification test is better thought as an omnibus specification test than as a standard test of
the validity of instruments commonly performed for linear models.  We discuss in more detail in
Appendix B why these tests should be interpreted with care.
In the linear case where eit is homoskedastic and uncorrelated, NLIV is just the well-
known two-stage least-squares estimator.  One difficulty with NLIV is that since we project a
non-linear function of the model variables and of the parameters (e) into a linear set of
instruments (V), the instruments must be chosen in a way that predicts sufficiently well the
explanatory righthand side of equation (13).9  In addition to the sector histories discussed above,
we thus include as instruments a set of interactions between the explanatory variables Xit (as
summarized by a skill index and years of experience) and the period t - 2 dummies for sector
affiliation {Dij,t-2, j = 1,..., J}.
In the perfect-information case, where unmeasured ability hi is observed by labor market
participants, the quasi-differenced equation (13) remains the same except that the innovation
term xi,t-1 drops from the error term eit. The remaining endogeneity problem is due to the
correlation between ln wi,t-1 and the error component mi,t-1. In this case, we simply use the full set
of interactions between the sector dummies at time t and t - 1 as instruments for ln wi,t-1.
10
                                                          
9 See Newey (1990) for more discussion and proposed (nonparametric) solutions to this problem.  Note that
choosing the functional form or the number of instruments can also be problematic in the linear model (Donald and
Newey, 1999).
10 In the absence of learning, either the interactions between sector affiliation at time t and t-1 or at time t-1
and t-2 can be used as instruments.  In practice, this choice has little impact on the results since both sets of
instruments predict very well the wage (see Appendix B).  Since sector affiliation is exogenous in this model, we do
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3. Data
The data set used in this paper is the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, or NLSY.
Individuals in the NLSY were between the ages of fourteen and twenty-one on January 1, 1979.
We use up to seventeen yearly observations per worker (from 1979 to 1996).11 One advantage of
the NLSY is that it allows us to follow workers from the time they make their first long-term
transition to the labor force.
We use the same sample-selection criteria as those used by Farber and Gibbons (1996).
We classify individuals as having made a long-term transition to the labor force when they spend
at least three consecutive years primarily working, following a year spent primarily not working.
Someone is classified as primarily working if she/he has worked at least half the weeks since the
last interview and averaged at least thirty hours per week during the working weeks.   Note that
the "last interview" does not necessarily refer to the previous calendar year if an individual had
not been interviewed the year before. Self-employed workers are deleted, as are members of the
NLSY military subsample.  Readers are referred to Appendix 1 in Farber and Gibbons (1996) for
more details on the criteria used to construct our NLSY sample.
Farber and Gibbons used NLSY data from 1979 to 1991 interview years, whereas our
data are through 1996. Except for the longer sampling frame, the only noteworthy difference
between our sample and Farber and Gibbons's has to do with union coverage in 1994. For some
reason, the question on union coverage in the current or most recent job at interview time (job
number 1 in the work history file) was not asked in that year. Although the error was caught and
fixed during the field period, many respondents were simply not asked this question even though
                                                                                                                                                                                          
not need to include the additional interaction terms between the skill index, experience, and sector affiliation at time
t-2 discussed above.  Note that Lemieux (1998) uses an identical strategy to estimate union wage differentials when
unmeasured ability is known to all labor-market participants but is differently rewarded in the union and non-union
sectors: the interaction between the union status at time t and t - 1 is used as an instrument for the lagged wage.
11 There was no interview in 1995.
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they should have been.  Consequently, the raw data shows a large number  "valid skips".12 We
provide a correction of our own to partially fix this problem and recover quite a few of those
missing observations. More precisely, if an individual in 1994 is working for the same employer
as the one he worked for in the previous interview, we assign the value of the union coverage
dummy for the previous interview year to the current one. If the individual interviewed in 1994
has started working for a new employer since the last interview, we check to see whether she/he
is still working for that employer in 1996. If so, we assign the value of the union coverage
dummy for that year to the 1994 interview.
From this NLSY sample we focus on the subsample of observations at which the
individual was working at the interview date for at least the previous three years. This sample
restriction enables us to use the first and second lags of various variables in the estimation, as
explained in Section 2.4. We exclude workers in agricultural jobs. Since we (later) divide
manufacturing into durable and nondurable goods manufacturing, we also exclude a few workers
who hold jobs in manufacturing industries that are hard to classify as producing durable as
opposed to nondurable goods.13 We are left with a sample of 35,438 observations on 5,904
workers that satisfy these sample-selection criteria.
To summarize the relationship between the wage premia and observable skills, we
construct a "skill index" for each worker. We first estimate a flexible log (hourly) wage equation
using our sample.14  The base explanatory variables used in the log wage equation are the AFQT
score, years of education, education category dummies (dropout, high school graduates, some
college, and college degree), (actual) experience, experience squared, dummy variables for race,
gender, marital status, union status, and a set of dummies for year, industry, and occupation.  We
also include sets of pairwise interactions between the education category dummies, gender, and
race, as well as interactions between gender and experience, gender and marital status, and race
                                                          
12 Personal communication from Steve McClaskie of the Center for Human Resource Research.
13 These industries are: stone, clay, and glass; tobacco manufacturing; leather and leather products; and not
specified manufacturing. Workers in these industries represent less than one percent of the full sample.
14 The wage variable in all estimated models is the hourly wage on the current job at the time of the survey.
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and experience.  Detailed regression results are reported in Appendix Table A with and without
the AFQT variable included.
We then use the estimated coefficients from that equation to predict the wage of each
worker. The skill index is the predicted wage based solely on the education, experience, and
AFQT score of the worker. That is, although characteristics such as occupation, industry, union
status, and demographic characteristics are included in the initial wage equation, they are not
used to construct the skill index for the worker. We normalize the skill index to have zero mean.
4. Wages and Returns to Skills Across Occupations
We believe that the concepts of sorting and comparative advantage are likely to play a
more important role for occupations than for industries, so we first estimate our models for
occupations.  As we mention in Section 5, other factors such as compensating wage differences
and rent-sharing may mask the importance of comparative advantage in the case of industries.
Furthermore, our one-factor model is well suited to cases where there is a natural ordering of
sectors from least skill-sensitive to most skill-sensitive.  We believe this ordering is more likely
apply to occupations (e.g. going from operatives to craft workers to managers) than industries.
4.1 Occupational Wage Premia without Comparative Advantage
Throughout the paper, we divide workers into seven conventional occupation
aggregates.15 In Table 1 we report the raw occupation log wage differentials (relative to the
service occupation) and the average values of measured skills (education and experience) and
other measured characteristics (race, sex, and marital status) by occupation. As is well known,
there are large differences across occupations in mean wages and in mean values for education
                                                          
15 Using a more detailed classification does not alter our basic findings and comes at the cost of less precise
estimates of the occupation effects. Precision is an issue for the some of the non-linear instrumental variables
models presented below.
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and other characteristics.  There is also a strong link between these two variables: the correlation
between the raw wage premium and the mean level of education is 0.81 (bottom row of Table 1).
The mean skill index for each occupation is reported in Column 7. In keeping with the
positive correlation between the wage premium and mean education, we find that the correlation
between the raw wage premium and the mean skill index is 0.96. But the cross-occupation
variation in mean log wages in Column 1 (standard deviation of 0.181) is almost twice as large
as cross-occupation variation in the skill index in Column 7 (standard deviation of 0.099),
suggesting that there may be more to the story than just observable skills. In this spirit, Column 1
of Table 2 reports an OLS regression of the log wage on the skill index and six occupation
dummies (operatives and laborers are the base occupation).  All the models reported in Table 2
also include controls for industry affiliation (nine dummy variables), gender, race, marital status,
union status, and a full set of year dummies.
The skill index is highly significant and has a coefficient of one (by construction), but the
occupation coefficients remain highly significant, although smaller than the raw wage
differentials reported in Table 1. Of course, such a regression merely replicates the common
finding that the occupation coefficients are significant even after controlling for measured
characteristics. We report it as our point of departure.
In this OLS model, the standard deviation of the estimated occupational wage premia is
.086.  Column 2 reports first-differenced estimates of these premia; their standard deviation falls
to .021. Of course, these first-differenced estimates might be attenuated by false transitions. One
approach to the false-transitions problem is to estimate a fixed-effect regression rather than a
first-differenced regression.16 We present fixed-effect estimates in Column 3; the occupational
wage premia have a standard deviation of .032. Another approach to the false-transitions
problem is to re-compute the first-differenced estimates on the sub-sample of observations in
which the worker reports taking a new job (with a new employer). The resulting wage premia (in
                                                          
16 Fixed-effect estimates use information from both first differences and longer differences and so are less
affected by measurement error than first-difference estimates are (Griliches and Hausman, 1986).
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Column 4) have a standard deviation of .036. In sum, the estimates in Columns 3 and 4 are
consistent with the view that more than half of the variation in occupational wage premia (after
controlling for measurable skills) may be due to unmeasured ability bias, even in our simplest
model without comparative advantage or learning.
In Columns 5 and 6 of Table 2 we explore the possibility of further bias associated with
learning (but not comparative advantage). As described at the end of Section 2.2, the problem is
that learning about ability may be correlated with the change in sector affiliation (such as where
job loss is exogenous but re-employment is not). As suggested in Section 2.2, we can use wage,
skill, and sector information from period t-1 or earlier to instrument for the change in sector
affiliation between periods t-1 and t. In Columns 5 and 6 we use as instruments the full set of
interactions between occupation dummies at times t-1 and t-2.  For the full sample (Column 5),
none of the individual occupation effects is significant. Furthermore, the standard deviation of
the estimated occupation effects is quite small (.009), and we cannot reject that these premia are
all zero (p-value of .46).  The results for the sub-sample of new jobs (Column 6) are relatively
similar.  Now some of the estimated occupation effects are individually significant, but we still
cannot reject the null hypothesis that all premia are jointly equal to zero (p-value of 0.12).
Note that the estimates of the model for the sample of new jobs are much less precise
than when all observations are being used.  As we will see in the next Section, limiting the
analysis to new jobs appears to be a much more efficient way of eliminating false transitions in
the case of industries than occupations.  The problem is that people can clearly change
occupation by being promoted or re-assigned to a different task while staying with the same
employer.  We lose these legitimate changes when we focus on new jobs only.  By contrast, it is
much more difficult for an employee to change industry while staying with the same employer.
This means we should lose little legitimate information by focusing on new jobs in the case of
industries.
In sum, our results suggest that accounting for both unmeasured ability and learning
2222
eliminates most of the occupational wage premia.  The results in Columns 2-4 indicate that
controlling for measured and unmeasured skills explains over 80 percent of the raw standard
deviation of wages across occupations (0.181).  The remaining premia are no longer significant
when learning is accounted for in Columns 5 and 6, though these results are less precise than in
the more standard models of Columns 1 to 4.
4.2 Occupational Wage Premia and Occupational Skill Premia
Our exploration of occupation wage premia without comparative advantage strongly
suggests that learning combined with the sorting of both measured and unmeasured skills
accounts for the bulk of occupational wage premia.  In this section we explore the sources of this
sorting by adding comparative advantage to the analysis.  We indeed find important differences
in the returns to measured and unmeasured skills across occupations. This finding suggests
caution in interpreting the standard occupational wage premia reported in Table 2 (and elsewhere
in the literature). In addition, as we describe below, such occupation-specific returns to skill
make estimated occupational wage premia difficult to interpret, even after controlling for
differences in returns to skills across sectors. As a result, we now shift our focus to these
differential returns to skill. In particular, we investigate whether high-skill workers are
concentrated in high-return occupations, as our theory suggests.
Table 3 extends our analysis of occupational wage premia in Table 2 by reporting not
only these premia but also occupation-specific returns to skills.  All models reported in Table 3
also include the same set of additional controls (gender, race, year dummies, etc.) as in Table 2.
Column 1 of Table 3 reports OLS estimates of the wage premia, while Column 2 reports the
occupation-specific returns to observable skill.  Most of the estimated returns to skill are quite
plausible.  For example, all occupations but the clerical occupations have a significantly larger
return to skill than operatives and laborers.  Managers and sales occupations have the largest
returns to skill, although the returns for professionals may be a bit smaller than expected.
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In spite of these significant differences in occupation-specific returns to observable skills
(p-value of .00 on the joint test of equality of returns), the associated occupational wage premia
are quite similar to those from Column 1 of Table 2 (which did not allow for occupation-specific
returns to skill). For example, the standard deviation of the estimated occupational wage premia
is .096 - slightly larger than the .086 in Column 1 of Table 2. But our analysis in Table 2
suggested an important role for unmeasured skills, so we next investigate occupation-specific
returns to unobservable skills.
The remaining models reported in Columns 3 through 6 of Table 3 allow for occupation-
specific returns to both measured and unmeasured skill. In all models, we include (but do not
show in the Table) a set of interactions between occupation and experience to capture the term
(1/2)bj2st2 in equation (13).17 We allow returns to measured and unmeasured skill to be different
but proportional.  In terms of the parameters of the model, this means that bj=kbj for all
occupations j, where k is a proportionality parameter.  As we report in the tables, proportionality
can never be rejected, but k is typically statistically different from 1.18
In the first model, reported in Columns 3 and 4, we analyze the model with comparative
advantage but without learning, so the only endogenous variable is the lagged wage. In these
models we use the full set of interactions between occupational affiliation at time t and t-1 as
instrumental variables.  Relative to the OLS model of Columns 1 and 2, two features of the
results in Columns 3 and 4 are striking.  First, none of the occupational wage premia remains
significant once occupation-specific returns to unmeasured skills are accounted for in the
estimation.  Recall that some of the premia were significant in the corresponding model for all
workers without learning and without comparative advantage (first-difference estimates in
Column 2 of Table 2).  This suggests that introducing comparative advantage can account for
                                                          
17 Strictly speaking, this term should appear in only the learning model.  We include it in all models with
unmeasured skills for the sake of comparability across specifications.
18 We test for proportionality by estimating an unrestricted model with separate returns to measured and
unmeasured skills and performing a non-linear Wald test (null hypothesis is that the ratio bj/bj is constant across
occupations).  The p-value from this test is reported in the third row from the bottom of Table 3.
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most of the remaining occupational wage premia, just as learning did in the last column of Table
2.  Second, most of the occupation-specific returns to skill remain significantly different from
one (the normalized return to skill for operatives and laborers).  Furthermore, the pattern of
returns to skill across occupations now shows professionals, managers, and sales occupations
with the highest returns.
The joint tests at the bottom of the Table confirm this pattern of results.  The null
hypothesis that the occupational wage premia are all zero cannot be rejected (p-value of .44)
while the null hypothesis that returns to skill are all the same can be rejected at standard
significance levels (p-value of .036).
As a final step, Columns 5-6 report estimates of our richest theoretical model - equation
(13), which allows for both comparative advantage and learning, so that both the lagged wage
and the current occupation are endogenous. As discussed earlier, we use the full set of
interactions between occupational affiliation at time t-1 and t-2 as instruments (plus interactions
between the skill index and occupational affiliation at time t-1 and t-2).  The results reported in
Columns 5 and 6 are similar though slightly less precise than in the corresponding model without
learning (Columns 3 and 4).  For instance, returns to skill among professional, managers and
sales occupation are 20 to 25 percent larger than for operative and laborers.  The difference is not
significant, however, except in the case of professionals.  Though the joint test of equality of the
returns across occupations can no longer be rejected at the five percent level, it is still rejected at
the 10 percent level (p-value of .085).  By contrast, as in the model without learning, none of the
occupational wage premia are significant.  The joint test that all occupational premia are the
same still cannot be rejected (p-value of .28).
4.3 Interpretation
The evidence reported in Tables 1 through 3 strongly suggests that comparative
advantage and sorting based on observable and unobservable skills play important roles in
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explaining raw occupational wage premia.  Table 1 shows strong and systematic sorting of
highly-skilled into highly-paid occupations (correlation coefficient of .96).  Perhaps not
surprisingly, Table 2 shows that controlling for measured and unmeasured skills in conventional
ways (OLS and first-differences) successively reduces the standard deviation of occupational
wage premia from 0.181 to 0.086 and to between 0.020 and 0.034 (depending on the estimator
used to control for time-invariant unmeasured skills).  Remaining occupational wage premia are
no longer significant once comparative advantage is explicitly accounted for by introducing
occupation-specific returns to measured and unmeasured skills (Columns 3-4 of Table 3).  The
pattern of occupation-specific returns to skill is strongly consistent with measured skill sorting
across occupations.  For example, professionals who are the most skilled occupation (Table 1)
also exhibit the largest return to skill (Column 4 of Table 3).
Interestingly, professionals also have the highest return to skill when learning is
introduced in the model of Columns 5 and 6.  More generally, the correlation between average
measured skills and returns to skill is 0.76 and 0.65 in the models with and without learning,
respectively.  Note that introducing learning does not change the results substantially once
comparative advantage is properly accounted for in Table 3.  One possible explanation for this
finding is that though learning about ability may be quite important in the first few years in the
labor market, it may not be as important further into workers' careers (Neal 1999).  This may
explain why learning plays a limited role in our NLSY sample where we have up to 15 years of
labor market observations per worker.
As discussed earlier, introducing learning has more impact on the estimated occupation
wage premia when comparative advantage is not properly accounted for (Table 2).  We suspect
that since models without comparative advantage are misspecified, instrumenting for
occupational affiliation as we do in the model with learning may help correct for some the biases
induced by the failure to control for comparative advantage.19
                                                          
19 For example, Wooldridge (1997) shows in a different context that using IV methods can sometimes yield a
consistent estimate of the average treatment effect in a model with heterogeneous treatment effects (a random-
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5. Wages and Returns to Skills Across Industries
A substantial literature has established that there are large and persistent wage
differentials among industries, even after controlling for a wide variety of worker and job
characteristics (Katz 1986; Dickens and Katz 1987; Krueger and Summers 1987, 1988). One
possibility is that these inter-industry wage differentials largely reflect differences in workers'
productive abilities that are not captured by the variables available in standard individual-level
data sets. An alternative explanation is that measured inter-industry wage differences are "true
wage differentials" reflecting compensating differentials, non-competitive rent-sharing, or
efficiency-wage considerations. Vigorous debate has centered on the extent to which industry
wage differences reflect competitive factors such as unmeasured ability and compensating
differentials (Murphy and Topel, 1987 and 1990) as opposed to labor-market rents, and on
whether such measured wage differentials potentially may justify certain types of industrial or
trade policies (Katz and Summers 1989; and Topel 1989).
In this context, our model with comparative advantage and learning can be viewed as a
renewed attempt at "explaining" inter-industry wage differentials by the systematic allocation of
unmeasured skills across industries.  For reasons mentioned earlier, we nonetheless expect
comparative advantage to play less of a role in explaining sectoral wage differences across
industries than across occupations.
5.1 Industry Wage Premia without Comparative Advantage
We divide workers into ten conventional industry aggregates.20 In Table 4 we report the
raw industry log wage differentials (relative to the retail trade industry) and the average values of
                                                                                                                                                                                          
coefficients model).  The analogy with our case is that we also have a random-coefficients model since the "effect"
of sector affiliation on wages depends systematically on skills in our model with comparative advantage.
20 Using a more detailed classification does not substantially alter our basic findings and comes at the cost of
less precise estimates of the industry effects.
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measured skills (education and experience) and other measured characteristics (race, sex, and
marital status) by industry. Like others, we find large differences across industries in mean
wages and in mean values for education and other characteristics. Like Dickens and Katz (1987),
we find substantial correlation between these raw wage premia and these mean characteristics.
For example, the correlation between the wage premium and the mean level of education is .49.
To move beyond individual skill measures such as education, we use the same skill index as in
the previous section. The mean skill index for each industry is reported in the final column of
Table 4. The correlation between the wage premium and the mean skill index is .85.  So, at first
pass, sorting on observable skill appears to play a slightly smaller role in explaining inter-
industry wage differences than it did for occupations (when the correlation coefficient was .96).
A related point is that that the cross-industry variation in mean log wages (.151) is much larger
than the cross-industry variation in the skill index (.045), whereas the cross-occupation variation
in the skill index (0.099) represented more than half the cross-occupation variation in wages
(0.181).
Table 5 reports the estimates of the models without comparative advantage.  All the
models reported in Table 5 (and Table 6) also include controls for occupational affiliation (six
dummy variables), gender, race, marital status, union status, and a full set of year dummies.  The
results without learning reported in Columns 1 through 4 are relatively similar to those obtained
by Krueger and Summers (1988) and others.  For instance, OLS estimates of the inter-industry
wage differentials in Column 1 are large and significant, with a standard deviation of .105.
Furthermore, more than half of the standard deviation of the OLS wage premia across industries
remains when unmeasured skills are controlled for using fixed effects (.054 in Column 3) or first
differences for new jobs (.059 in Column 4).  As discussed for occupations, the smaller standard
deviation of industry wage premia obtained from first differences for all workers (.040) is likely
due to false transitions among workers staying with the same employer.21
                                                          
21 Our results are also consistent with Krueger and Summers' (1988) finding that first-differenced estimates of
the industry wage effects can be significantly biased downwards because of misclassification errors in industry
affiliation. Standard first-differenced estimates are misspecified when the whole sample is used but well-specified
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Columns 5 and 6 report first-differenced IV models, to allow for the possibility of
learning (but not comparative advantage).  The instrumental variables used in this model are the
full set of interactions between industry affiliation at time t-1 and t-2.  The standard deviation of
the estimated inter-industry wage differentials falls somewhat (from about .055 in Columns 3
and 4 to about .042 in Columns 5 and 6).  Unlike the case of occupations, however, the null
hypothesis of no industry wage premia is still strongly rejected (p-value of .0001), even in these
IV estimates.
Other interesting patterns emerge from the comparison of results for industry and
occupations.  For example, the standard deviation of raw wages differences is smaller for
industries than for occupations (in Column 1 of Tables 1 and 4), but the standard deviation of the
wage premia across sectors is substantially larger for industries than for occupation in the
standard models without comparative advantage or learning (OLS, first-difference and fixed-
effect estimates in Columns 1 through 4 of Tables 2 and 5).  This comparison strongly suggests
that the sorting of measured and unmeasured skills across sectors plays more of a role in
explaining the raw wage differentials across occupations than across industries.
A more subtle point is that controlling for skills has much more impact for some
industries than others.  Take the case of two relatively "high-wage" industries, construction and
professional and business services (PBS).  Despite high wages, construction has relatively low
measured skills, while PBS has the highest measured skills of all industries (Table 4).  The raw
log wage differences indicate that PBS pays 0.114 more than construction.  Just controlling for
measured skills reverses this pattern.  The OLS estimates indicate that construction now pays
.026 more than PBS (Column 1 of Table 5).  Controlling for unmeasured skills increases the gap
in favor of construction to between 0.062 and 0.089, depending on the estimator being used
(Columns 3 and 4).
                                                                                                                                                                                          
for job changers. Since misclassification errors in industry changes are much less likely to occur when a job change
is observed than otherwise, we believe misclassification errors are the primary source of misspecification in the first-
differenced estimates for the whole sample.
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This differential effect of controlling for skills (even without learning or comparative
advantage) suggests that no single theory can likely explain the wage premia for all industries.
In sectors like PBS, the systematic sorting of skills that follows from our model of comparative
advantage likely accounts for a large share of the premium; in sectors like construction,
compensating wage differences and unionization (rent-sharing) are more plausible explanations.
We next explore this hypothesis formally by introducing comparative advantage in the estimated
models.
5.2 Industry Wage Premia and Industry Skill Premia
Table 6 extends our analysis by reporting not only the industry wage premia but also
industry-specific returns to skills. Columns 1 and 2 report OLS estimates of the wage premia and
returns to measurable skills, respectively.  As in the case of occupations, there is substantial
heterogeneity in the returns to skill across industry.  In spite of this heterogeneity in industry-
specific returns to skills, controlling for this heterogeneity reduces the standard deviation of the
estimated industry wage premia only slightly, from .105 (in Column 1 of Table 5) to .099.
Roughly speaking, industries with high wage premia tend to exhibit high return to skill, though
construction is an important exception.
A similar pattern holds when industry-specific returns to both measured and unmeasured
skills are introduced in Columns 3 and 4.22  Unlike the case of occupations, however, several of
the industry wage premia remain positive and significant.  Interestingly, the joint test of equality
of industry wage premia is strongly rejected while equality in industry-specific returns to skill
cannot be rejected (p=.13).  This is the opposite of the case with occupations, where equality of
                                                          
22 As in the case of occupations, we constrain returns to measured and unmeasured skills to be proportional in
all the models with industry-specific returns to skill.  The Table shows that proportionality is never rejected (p-
values ranging from .45 to .96) and that the proportionality parameter is always positive and well determined.  The
instrumental variables are also selected in the same fashion as in the models for occupation.  In the models without
learning, we use interactions between industry affiliation at time t and t-1 as instruments.  In the models with
learning, the instruments used are the interactions between industry affiliation at time t-1 and t-2 and the interactions
of industry affiliation at time t-2 with the skill index and experience.
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the wage premia could not be rejected while equality in the occupation-specific returns to skill
was rejected.  This finding is consistent with our interpretation that comparative advantage plays
a more important role in explaining sectoral wage premia for occupations than for industries.
But this is not to say that comparative advantage plays no role in wage and affiliation decisions
across industries.  For example, comparing Column 3 to Column 1, the two "high wage"
industries that experience the largest decrease in estimate wage premium are finance, insurance
and real estate (FIRE) and professional and business services (PBS).  These two industries also
happen to have the largest estimated returns to skill in Column 4 and relatively high skill levels
(Table 4).
The models reported in the remaining columns of Table 6 are qualitatively similar to the
model for all workers without comparative advantage of Columns 3 and 4.  In all cases, the joint
test of equality of industry wage premia is strongly rejected while equality in industry-specific
returns to skill cannot be rejected.   As in the case of occupations, accounting for learning has
relatively little effect on the results.
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5.3 Interpretation
The existing literature on inter-industry wage differentials suggests that neither a simple
unmeasured-ability explanation (in which ability is equally valued in all industries and market
perceptions of worker quality are time invariant) nor a pure rent-based explanation appears fully
consistent with evidence from longitudinal analyses of the wage changes of industry switchers
(Krueger and Summers, 1988) or the pre- and post-displacement wages of workers displaced by
plant closings (Gibbons and Katz, 1992). These findings have motivated recent work that has
focused on econometric approaches for estimating industry wage differentials while accounting
for heterogeneous matches between workers (Neal 1995; Bils and McLaughlin 2001; Kim 1998).
Our approach is also in this vein.23
Our results reinforce the view that a single explanation does not fit all industries.  For
instance, the industry wage premia in mining, manufacturing and construction remain large and
statistically significant even in our richest model with comparative advantage and learning.  By
contrast, introducing these two factors essentially eliminates the wage premia in industries such
as FIRE and PBS.
6. Conclusion
We develop a model of wages and sector choices that generalizes the static model of
sorting with perfect information to the case in which some skills are unobserved by both the
market and the worker. Wage changes and sector mobility arise endogenously as the market and
the incumbent firm learn about a worker's skills. We show how this model can be estimated
using non-linear instrumental-variables techniques.
We illustrate our theoretical and econometric approach by studying both occupations and
industries. Broadly speaking, the results suggest that the measured occupational wage
                                                          
23 A complementary approach focuses on correlations between ability and investments in sector-specific skills
(Neal 1998).
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differentials in a cross-section regression are largely due to unmeasured and unobserved worker
skills.  We find strong evidence that the sorting of skills into "high-wage" occupations is
explained by high returns to skills in these occupations.  Although comparative advantage
appears to play a fundamental role in occupational wage differences, the role of learning is more
limited.  One possible explanation for this finding is that though learning may be quite important
in the first few years in the labor market, it may not be as important later on.
The results for industries are mixed, which is consistent with the existing literature.  Our
richest model with comparative advantage and learning explains relatively well the cross-
sectional premia in industries like finance, insurance and real estate and professional and
business services.  More traditional explanations like compensating differences and rent-sharing
seem to be better suited for industries such as mining, manufacturing, and construction.
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TABLE 1
Average Characteristics by Occupationa
                               Years of:        Fraction:
                             ????????????? ????????????????????         Sample
                  Raw Wage   Educ-  Exper- Female Non-  Married  Skill  Propor-
                Differencesb ation  ience         white          Index   tion
                    (1)      (2)    (3)    (4)    (5)    (6)     (7)      (8)
1. Professionals    0.522    15.66  7.38   0.534  0.136  0.583   0.1479    0.212
2. Managers         0.425    14.38  8.31   0.432  0.137  0.562   0.1049    0.138
3. Sales            0.388    14.38  7.49   0.400  0.118  0.550   0.0828    0.052
   occupations
4. Clerical         0.116    13.17  7.27   0.786  0.233  0.503  -0.0907    0.203
   occupations
5. Craft workers    0.290    12.17  7.96   0.077  0.157  0.499  -0.0358    0.118
6. Operatives and   0.090    11.92  7.44   0.244  0.265  0.489  -0.0979    0.171
   laborers
7. Service          0.000    12.73  7.10   0.532  0.310  0.424  -0.0989    0.108
   Occupations
Standard deviation  0.181     1.26  0.39   0.210  0.069  0.050   0.099
(across occupations)
Correlation with    1.00      0.81  0.53  -0.12  -0.94   0.93    0.96
raw wage diff.
a. Based on a sample of 35,438 observations for 5,904 workers. See text
for more details.
b. Mean log wage in the industry relative to service occupations (mean
log wage in service occupations is 1.431).
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TABLE 2
Estimates of Occupation Wage Differentials Without Comparative Advantagea
          No Learning                  Learning
                           ??????????????????????????????????  ????????????????
Estimation Method:          OLS      FD       FE       FD       FDIVb    FDIVb
Sample:                     All      All      All      New      All      New
                                                       Jobs              Jobs
                            (1)      (2)      (3)      (4)      (5)      (6)
Occupation Effects:
1. Professionals           0.208*   0.042*   0.043*   0.095*   0.019    0.002
                          (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.016)  (0.014)  (0.030)
2. Managers                0.213*   0.022*   0.049*   0.052*  -0.001    0.048
                          (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.015)  (0.013)  (0.025)
3. Sales occupations       0.191*   0.006    0.018    0.044*  -0.012    0.054
                          (0.010)  (0.009)  (0.010)  (0.018)  (0.017)  (0.031)
4. Clerical                0.044*  -0.003   -0.018*   0.010    0.007    0.050*
   occupations            (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.014)  (0.013)  (0.025)
5. Craft workers           0.144*   0.038*   0.039*   0.085*   0.010    0.041*
                          (0.008)  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.013)  (0.010)  (0.021)
6. Service occupations     0.021*  -0.019*  -0.045*  -0.000    0.010    0.023
                          (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.023)
7. Operatives and          0.000    0.000    0.000    0.000    0.000    0.000
   Laborers
Skill Index                0.999*   0.811*   1.185*   0.764*   0.598*   0.804*
                          (0.011)  (0.050)  (0.046)  (0.107)  (0.037)  (0.108)
R-square                   0.418    0.035    0.789    0.070    0.031   0.061
Observations               35438    35438    35438     9198    35438    9198
Overidentification Test    ---      ---      ---       ---     .0001   .0001
(p-value)
Test of equality of       .0000     .0001    .0001    .0001    .4563   .1165
Occup. Effects (p-value)
Standard deviation         0.086    0.021    0.032    0.036    0.009    0.021
of occup. effects
Adjusted std. deviationc   0.086    0.020    0.032    0.034     ---      ---
a: Standard errors are in parentheses. "*" indicates that the estimated
coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 95 percent confidence
level. All specifications also include controls for gender, race, marital
status, year effects, industry (9 dummies), and a dummy for collective
bargaining coverage.
b: Instrumental variables (for changes in occupation) are the full set of
interactions between the occupation dummies at time t-1 and t-2.
c: The adjusted standard deviation is the actual standard deviation of
the estimated occupation effects corrected for the sampling variation in these
estimates.
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TABLE 3
Estimates of Occupation Wage Differentials With Comparative Advantagea
                                  No Learning                   Learning
                          ??????????????????????????????????    ????????????????
Estimation Method:             OLS                NLIV                 NLIV
Sample:                        All                All                  All
                          ???????????????   ???????????????      ???????????????
Occupation effects:        Main Interactedb  Main Interactedb     Main  Interactedb
 (1)     (2)       (3)     (4)          (5)     (6)
1. Professionals           0.263*  1.120*    0.069   1.271*       0.029   1.259*
                          (0.008) (0.034)   (0.034) (0.086)      (0.049) (0.116)
2. Managers                0.233*  1.332*    0.046   1.201*       0.032   1.196
                          (0.008) (0.036)   (0.034) (0.077)      (0.049) (0.110)
3. Sales occupations       0.199*  1.476*    0.054   1.218*       0.087   1.224   
                          (0.011) (0.047)   (0.038) (0.083)      (0.061) (0.128)
4. Clerical                0.066*  1.027     0.033   1.162*       0.004   1.099
   occupations            (0.008) (0.036)   (0.031) (0.073)      (0.044) (0.097)
5. Craft workers           0.168*  1.138*    0.040   1.023       -0.024   0.971   
                          (0.008) (0.044)   (0.026) (0.065)      (0.036) (0.086)
6. Service occupations    -0.037*  1.107*    0.047   1.127        0.088   1.204
                          (0.009) (0.042)   (0.035) (0.076)      (0.060) (0.133)
7. Operatives and          0.000   1.000     0.000   1.000        0.000   1.000
   Laborers
Proportionality factorb          ---            0.8652*               0.7847*
between measured and                           (0.0710)              (0.0899)
unmeasured skills
Endogenous Variablesc           ---                 w1                  w1,D0
Instrumental Variablesc         ---               D0*D1           D1*D2,SK*D2,E*D2
Observations                   35438              35438                35438
Overidentification test         ---               .0000                .0000
(p-value)
Test of equality of            .0000              .4372                .2807
Occupation Effects (p-value)
Test of equality of            .0000              .0357                .0852
Interaction slopes (p-value)
Test of proportionalityb         ---              .1391                .5403
(p-value)
Standard deviation             0.096              0.020                0.040
of occupation effects
Adjusted std. Deviationd       0.095               ---                  ---
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Notes to Table 3
a: Standard errors are in parentheses.  In the case of main effects, "*"
indicates that the estimated coefficient is significantly different from zero at the
95 percent confidence level.  In the case of interactions, "*" indicates that the
estimated coefficient is significantly different from one at the 95 percent confidence
level. All specifications also include controls for gender, race, marital status, year
effects, industry (9 dummies), collective bargaining coverage, and (except in columns
1-2) occupation-specific experience effects.
b: In columns 1-2, the interaction terms indicate the effect of measured skills
in the occupation relative to operatives and laborers (effect normalized to 1 in
service occupations). In columns 3-6, the interaction terms indicate the effect of
both measured and unmeasured skills in the occupation, again relative to operatives
and laborers, but these occupation-specific slopes for measured and unmeasured skills
are constrained to have the same proportionality factor across all occupations.  The
estimated proportionality factor is reported at the bottom of the first panel; the
test of the proportionality restriction is reported in the second panel.
c: In the endogenous variables, w1 stands for the lagged wage and D0 stands for
contemporaneous values of the occupation dummies {Dijt, j=1,..,6}. In the instrumental
variables, D1 and D2 stand for the first and second lag of occupations dummies, SK
stands for the skill index, and E stands for experience.
d: The adjusted standard deviation is the actual standard deviation of the
estimated occupation effects corrected for the sampling variation in these estimates.
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TABLE 4
Average Characteristics by Industrya
                               Years of:        Fraction:
                             ????????????? ????????????????????         Sample
                  Raw Wage   Educ-  Exper- Female Non-  Married  Skill  Propor-
                Differencesb ation  ience         white          Index   tion
                    (1)      (2)    (3)    (4)    (5)    (6)     (7)      (8)
1. Mining and       0.359    13.15  7.76   0.303  0.153  0.577   0.0106   0.142
   Durable Manuf.
2. Non-Durable      0.203    13.02  7.40   0.405  0.170  0.529  -0.0304   0.094
   Manufacturing
3. Construction     0.283    11.99  8.06   0.085  0.166  0.486  -0.0457   0.062
4. Transpo., Comm., 0.387    13.44  8.09   0.333  0.253  0.529   0.0261   0.066
   Utilities
5. Finance. Insur., 0.348    14.10  7.43   0.659  0.172  0.505   0.0140   0.089
   Real Estate
6. Profess. and     0.397    14.44  7.52   0.471  0.173  0.525   0.0628   0.084
   Bus. Services
7. Personal        -0.032    12.63  7.26   0.400  0.236  0.436  -0.0685   0.041
   Service
8. Wholesale Trade  0.222    14.39  7.34   0.659  0.219  0.545   0.0239   0.216
9. Retail Trade     0.000    12.92  7.16   0.455  0.190  0.426  -0.0654   0.145
10. Public Admin.   0.392    14.11  8.06   0.484  0.307  0.593   0.0494   0.062
Standard deviation  0.151     0.78  0.34   0.160  0.047  0.051   0.045
(across industries)
Correlation with    1.00      0.49  0.70  -0.02   0.04   0.80    0.85
raw wage diff.
a. Based on a sample of 35,438 observations on 5,904 workers. See text
for more details.
b. Mean log wage in the industry relative to retail trade (mean log wage
in the retail trade industry is 1.445).
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TABLE 5
Estimates of Industry Wage Differentials Without Comparative Advantagea
          No Learning                  Learning
                           ??????????????????????????????????  ????????????????
Estimation Method:          OLS      FD       FE       FD       FDIVb    FDIVb
Sample:                     All      All      All    New Jobs   All    New Jobs
                            (1)      (2)      (3)      (4)      (5)      (6)
Industry Effects:
1. Mining and Durable      0.280*   0.111*   0.148*   0.165*   0.065*   0.146*
   Manufacturing          (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.014)  (0.015)  (0.023)
2. Non-Durable             0.182*   0.075*   0.104*   0.108*   0.036*   0.071*
   Manufacturing          (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.015)  (0.016)  (0.024)
3. Construction            0.268*   0.134*   0.151*   0.173*   0.103*   0.144*
                          (0.010)  (0.009)  (0.010)  (0.017)  (0.020)  (0.030)
4. Transpo., Comm.,        0.275*   0.093*   0.131*   0.144*   0.055*   0.112*
   Utilities              (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.010)  (0.017)  (0.021)  (0.029)
5. Finance, Insurance,     0.248*   0.061*   0.110*   0.090*  -0.015    0.062*
   Real Estate            (0.008)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.016)  (0.024)  (0.027)
6. Prof. and Business      0.242*   0.064*   0.089*   0.084*  -0.003    0.049*
   Services               (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.022)
7. Personal Services       0.006   -0.012   -0.001   -0.001*  -0.017    0.014
                          (0.011)  (0.009)  (0.010)  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.026)
8. Wholesale Trade         0.092*   0.054*   0.067*   0.079*   0.035*   0.066*
                          (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.012)  (0.014)  (0.021)
9. Retail Trade            0.000    0.000    0.000    0.000    0.000    0.000
10. Public Admin.        0.244*   0.100*   0.149*   0.150*   0.029    0.081*
                          (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.022)  (0.024)  (0.039)
Skill Index                1.000*   0.811*   1.185*   0.749*   0.828*   0.767*
                          (0.012)  (0.050)  (0.046)  (0.107)  (0.050)  (0.107)
R-square                   0.418    0.036     ---     0.072     ---      ---
Observations               35438    35438    35438    9198     35438    9198
Overidentification Test     ---      ---      ---      ---     .0001    .0003
(p-value)
Test of equality of        .0000    .0000    .0000    .0000    .0001    .0001
Industry Effects (p-value)
Standard deviation         0.105    0.040    0.054    0.059    0.037    0.046
of industry effects
Adjusted st. deviationc    0.104    0.039    0.054    0.057    0.032    0.038
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Notes to Table 5
a: Standard errors are in parentheses. "*" indicates that the estimated
coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 95 percent confidence level.
All specifications also include controls for gender, race, marital status, year
effects, occupation (6 dummies), and collective bargaining coverage.
b: Instrumental variables (for changes in industry affiliation) are the full
set of interactions between the industry affiliation dummies at time t-1 and t-2.
c: The adjusted standard deviation is the actual standard deviation of the
estimated industry effects corrected for the sampling variation in these estimates.
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TABLE 6
Estimates of Inter-Industry Wage Differentials With Comparative Advantagea
                                             No Learning                                     Learning
                           ??????????????????????????????????????????????????    ????????????????????????????????
Estimation Method:             OLS                NLIV            NLIV                NLIV              NLIV
Sample:                        All                All           New Jobs              All             New Jobs
                          ???????????????   ???????????????   ???????????????   ???????????????   ???????????????
Industry effects:         Main Interactedb   Main Interactedb   Main Interactedb  Main Interactedb  Main Interactedb
 (1)     (2)       (3)     (4)       (5)     (6)       (7)     (8)       (9)    (10)
1. Mining and Durable     0.282
*
  1.182
*
    0.163
*
  1.124*    0.254
*
  1.138     0.144*  1.158     0.182*  0.978
   Manufacturing         (0.008) (0.042)   (0.033) (0.062)   (0.051) (0.100)   (0.047) (0.100)   (0.060) (0.119)
2. Non-Durable            0.187
*
  1.208*    0.093
*
  1.089     0.123*  1.114     0.112*  1.144     0.167*  1.282
   Manufacturing         (0.009) (0.046)   (0.033) (0.060)   (0.051) (0.096)   (0.049) (0.100)   (0.089) (0.179)
3. Construction           0.248*  0.823*    0.124*  1.005     0.173*  0.968     0.146*  1.115     0.169*  0.875
                         (0.011) (0.054)   (0.040) (0.087)   (0.056) (0.133)   (0.065) (0.152)   (0.069) (0.147)
4. Transpo., Comm.,       0.276*  0.969     0.114*  1.094     0.201*  1.182     0.053   1.275     0.190*  1.223
   Utilities             (0.009) (0.048)   (0.041) (0.079)   (0.069) (0.135)   (0.063) (0.156)   (0.097) (0.201)
5. Finance, Insurance,    0.237*  1.296*    0.037   1.212*    0.125*  1.362*   -0.040   1.156     0.029   1.241
   Real Estate           (0.009) (0.049)   (0.040) (0.081)   (0.061) (0.131)   (0.052) (0.137)   (0.072) (0.181)
6. Prof. and Business     0.224*  1.341*    0.052   1.176*    0.092   1.223*    0.028   1.132     0.084   1.098
   Services              (0.009) (0.049)   (0.036) (0.070)   (0.052) (0.108)   (0.046) (0.105)   (0.062) (0.133)
7. Personal Services     -0.023   0.625*   -0.050   0.970    -0.047   0.939     0.066   1.232     0.112   1.167
                         (0.012) (0.056)   (0.054) (0.123)   (0.078) (0.192)   (0.105) (0.232)   (0.145) (0.311)
8. Wholesale Trade        0.102*  0.877*    0.069   1.148*    0.109*  1.165     0.095   1.248*    0.180*  1.219
                         (0.007) (0.032)   (0.033) (0.069)   (0.051) (0.108)   (0.051) (0.118)   (0.080) (0.166)
9. Retail Trade           0.000   1.000     0.000   1.000     0.000   1.000     0.000   1.000     0.000   1.000
                           ---     ---       ---     ---       ---     ---       ---     ---       ---     ---
10. Public                0.251*  0.936     0.119*  1.155
*
    0.183*  1.233     0.099   1.300     0.039   1.119
    Administration       (0.010) (0.047)   (0.036) (0.078)   (0.064) (0.162)   (0.061) (0.176)   (0.077) (0.195)
Proportionalityb               ---              0.987
*
            0.724
*
            0.860
*
            0.671
*
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Parameter                                      (0.063)           (0.103)           (0.077)           (0.111)
Endogenous Variables           ---               w1                w1                w1,D0             w1,D0
Instrumental Variablesc        ---               D0*D1             D0*D1       D1*D2,SK*D2,E*D2  D1*D2,SK*D2,E*D2
Observations                   35438             35428              9198             35438              9198
Overidentification test         ---              .0001             .0002             .0000             .0169
(p-value)
Test of equality of            .0000             .0000             .0000             .0018             .0259
Industry Effects (p-value)
Test of equality of            .0000             .1331             .2473             .6980             .1996
Industry Slopes (p-value)
Standard deviation             0.099             0.061             0.086             0.058             0.038
of industry effects
Adjusted st. deviationd        0.098             0.048             0.065              ---               ---
Test of proportionalityb         ---              .9645             .4487             .4649             .5597
(p-value)
a: In the case of main effects, "*" indicates that the estimated coefficient is significantly different from
zero at the 95 percent confidence level.  In the case of interactions, "*" indicates that the estimated coefficient
is significantly different from one at the 95 percent confidence level.  All specifications also include controls
for gender, race, marital status, year effects, occupation (6 dummies), collective bargaining coverage, and
industry-specific experience effects (except in the model of columns 1-2).
b: In columns 1-2, the interaction terms indicate the effect of measured skills in the industry relative to
retail trade (effect normalized to 1 in this industry). In columns 3-10, the interaction terms indicate the effect
of both measured and unmeasured skills in the industry, again relative to retail trade, but these industry-specific
slopes for measured and unmeasured skills are constrained to be proportional across all industries.  The estimated
constant of proportionality between measured and unmeasured skills is reported at the bottom of the first panel;
the test of the proportionality restriction is reported in the second panel.
c: In the endogenous variables, w1 stands for the lagged wage and D0 stands for contemporaneous values of
the occupation dummies {Dijt, j=1,..,6}. In the instrumental variables, D1 and D2 stand for the first and second
lag of occupations dummies, SK stands for the skill index, and E stands for experience.
d. The adjusted standard deviation is the actual standard deviation of the estimated industry effects
corrected for the sampling variation in these estimates.
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Appendix Table A
Log Wage Equations estimated to construct the skill index
                    (1)             (2)
Variables used to construct the skill index:
AFQT                ---            0.272
                                  (0.010)
Years of educ      0.038           0.028
                  (0.003)         (0.003)
Educ. Categ.
 HS dropout       -0.126          -0.046
                  (0.028)         (0.028)
 HS grad          -0.140          -0.095
                  (0.018)         (0.018)
 Some coll.       -0.138          -0.124
                  (0.017)         (0.017)
Experience         0.050           0.047
                  (0.004)         (0.003)
Exp. squared      -0.054          -0.058
(/100)            (0.018)         (0.018)
Other control variables:
Female            -0.100          -0.090
                  (0.012)         (0.012)
Married            0.083)          0.079
                  (0.006)         (0.005)
Non-white         -0.071          -0.008
                  (0.017)         (0.017)
Union              0.168           0.176
(0.005)         (0.005)
Year dummies        yes             yes
Industry dummies    yes             yes
Occupation dummies  yes             yes
Interaction terms:
Fem*HS dropout    -0.001          -0.012
                  (0.018)         (0.018)
Fem*HS grad.       0.002           0.005
                  (0.012)         (0.012)
Fem*Some coll.     0.021           0.037
                  (0.013)         (0.013)
Fem*Experience    -0.000          -0.001
                  (0.001)         (0.001)
Fem*Married       -0.081          -0.076
                  (0.008)         (0.008)
Fem*Non-white      0.021           0.021
                  (0.010)         (0.010)
Exp*HS dropout    -0.015          -0.014
                  (0.002)         (0.002)
Exp*Hs grad       -0.007          -0.007
                  (0.002)         (0.001)
Exp*Some coll     -0.001          -0.001
                  (0.002)         (0.002)
NW*HS dropout      0.087           0.050
                  (0.019)         (0.019)
NW*HS grad         0.001          -0.006
                  (0.014)         (0.014)
NW*Some coll      -0.004          -0.004
                  (0.015)         (0.015)
NW*experience     -0.002          -0.003
                  (0.002)         (0.002)
Constant           1.046           1.060
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                  (0.049)         (0.049)
R-squared          0.405           0.418
Note: All models are estimated on a sample of 35,438 observations for 5,904
workers.  The skill index is constructed by computing a predicted wage from
equation (2) using only the variables AFQT, education (both years of education
and education categories) and experience, and holding the other variables
(female, married, non-white, union, year, industry and occupation) at their
average sample values.
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Appendix B: Choice of instruments
This appendix explains the choice of the interaction between the sector affiliation at time t-1 and t-2 as the main set
of instruments in model with comparative advantage and learning.  The intuition for this choice is most easily
understood using of Figure 1.  First note that in the most general model with comparative advantage and learning,
Figure 1 remains as is except that the unmeasured ability hi is replaced by its expected value conditional on the
available information, mi,t-1.  Consider the case of sectors j and j-1 in the Figure 1.  There are four possible "sector
histories" in these two sectors.  Workers can either "stay" in sector j-1 or j in both time periods, or switch (from j to
j-1 or from j-1 to j).  Workers with expected ability close to the critical value vj-1(X) are more likely to switch sector
than either workers with expected ability clearly lower than vj-1(X) (sector j-1 stayers) or clearly higher than vj-1(X)
(sector j-1 stayers).  In terms of expected ability and wages, "switchers" currently in sector j-1 should earn more than
other workers in sector j-1, while "switchers" currently in sector j should earn less than other workers in sector j.
Appendix Tables B1 (occupations) and B2 (industries) show that the data is broadly consistent with this prediction.
These tables show the average log wages as a function of current and previous sector affiliations.  For example,
consider operatives and laborers as sector j-1 and craft workers as sector j.  As expected, "stayers" in the craft
occupation earn more (0.08) than craft workers who switched from operatives and laborers to craft (-0.09).  By
contrast, workers who "switch down" from craft to operatives and laborers earn more (-0.11) than "stayers" in the
operative and laborers occupation (-0.17).
This example shows how the interaction between sector affiliation at time t and t-1 helps predict wages even after
controlling for the current sector affiliation.  Similar reasoning can be used to show how the interaction between
sector affiliation at time t-1 and t-2 can be used to predict sector affiliation at time t.  Recall that like the lagged
wage, the current sector affiliation is endogenous in the model with comparative advantage and learning.
Consider, for example, the choice of sector at time t of individuals observed to be in sector j at time t-1.  Remember
from Figure 1 that the expected ability of sector j workers (at time t-1) who were in sector j-1 at time t-2 should be
lower (close to vj-1(X)) than the expected ability of sector j workers who were also in sector j at time t-2.  Consider a
positive productivity signal that increases expected ability mi .  Since sector j stayers (at time t-1 and t-2) are closer
to the upper critical value vj(X) than the switchers who just came from sector j-1, the stayers are more likely to move
to sector j+1 at time t than the switchers.  This shows how the interaction between sector affiliation at time t-1 and t-
2 can be used to predict sector affiliation at time t.
In summary, sector histories (interaction between sector dummies at time t-1 and t-2) should help predict both the
wage at t-1 and the sector affiliation at time t in the model with comparative advantage and learning.  Appendix
Tables B1 and B2 suggest they do so in the case of the wage.  A more formal test consists of testing the predictive
power of the sector histories on the lagged wage and current affiliation after controlling for all other exogenous
variables of the model.  In a linear model, this test is just the standard F-test of the predictive power of the excluded
instruments in the first-stage equation.  Testing for the predictive power of instruments is more complicated in a
non-linear context.  In the linear model y = xb + e, the "first-stage" consists of projecting all the right hand side
variables (x) on the set of instruments, where the x variables also happen to be (minus) the derivative (or gradient) of
e with respect the parameters b (since e = y - xb).  In the non-linear model, the equivalent of the first-stage is thus a
regression of the gradient of e with respect to the structural parameters.  Those derivatives will typically be non-
linear combinations of various x variables.  One way to measure the predictive power of the instruments is thus to
compute F-tests on the excluded instruments in these "gradient" regressions.
The more intuitive approach we follow is to linearize the gradients as a function of the various explanatory
variables.  Once this linearization is performed, we can simply compute the usual F-test on the "first-stage"
equations for the lagged wage and the current sector affiliation.  To be consistent with the estimated models of Table
3 and Table 6, our excluded instruments are the interactions between sector affiliation at time t-1 and t-2 as well as
interactions of sector affiliation at time t-2 with the skill index and experience.  The F-statistics are reported below.
In all cases, they largely exceed the critical values (at the 95 percent confident level) of 1.26 for industries and 1.39
for occupations:
F-test of the predictive power of instruments
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Lagged Current sector # of excluded
wage (range of values) instruments
Occupations: 16.27 16.27-38.69 60
Industries: 11.46 17.45-26.68 117
As mentioned in the text and tables, in the case with comparative advantage but no learning we use the sector
affiliations at time t and t-1 (instead of t-1 and t-2) as instruments.  In this case, the F-statistics are 10.70 and 8.27 for
occupations and industries, respectively, which largely exceeds the critical values.
Overidentification test
Having established that the instruments predict well the lagged wage and sector affiliation, it is also important to
know whether the instruments are valid in the sense that they are uncorrelated with the error term in equation (13).
As discussed in Section 2.4, the overidentification test is the natural way of testing this hypothesis.  In a complicated
non-linear model like ours, however, this test is an omnibus test that can fail either because the model is
misspecified or because the model is well-specified but the instruments are invalid.  Intuitively speaking, the model
is overidentified when there are more instruments than parameters.  So the model may either fail the
overidentification test because not enough parameters are included (model misspecified) or because some of the
instruments are invalid.  In the absence of further information, we cannot conclude that the instruments are invalid
just because our models do not generally pass the overidenfication test.
For example, we use throughout the paper a convenient single-index model in which wages in all sectors are linear
functions of the same underlying index of measured and unmeasured skills.  While this assumption is used for
reasons of convenience and clarity, it is well-known to be restrictive in models with more than two sectors (see
Heckman and Scheinkman, 1987).  By contrast, Lemieux (1998) argues that the single index model imposes little
restriction when only two sectors are used.
It is easy to see in the three sector case illustrated in Figure 1 why the single index model is restrictive.  Consider
sector j-1 and j.  The relative slope and intercepts in the two sectors can be estimated using the subsample of
workers that are in these two sectors at time t and t-1 (and t-2 in the model with learning).  Similarly, observations
from sectors j and j+1 can be used to estimate the relative slope and intercepts in these two sectors.  Say we
normalize the slope in sector j-1 to 1 and estimate the slope of sector j relative to j-1 to be 1.2.  If the slope in sector
j+1 relative to j is also 1.2, it follows that the slope of sector j+1 relative to j-1 is 1.44.
According to the model, it is unlikely that a worker would switch directly from sector j-1 to j+1 or vice versa.  But
since those transitions are actually observed in the data, it is possible to use the subsample of workers in the two
sectors in two consecutive periods to estimate the relative slope and intercepts in sectors j-1 and j+1.  To the extent
that the resulting slope (for example) is statistically different from 1.44, the overidentification test will fail since
different identification strategies yield different estimates of the slopes.  In this case we would conclude, however,
that the failure of the overidentification is a consequence of the fact that the single index model is an
oversimplication.
In light of this example, we re-estimate the model of columns 3 and 4 of Table 3 using only workers who either stay
in the same occupation at t and t-1 (66 percent of the sample) or move across adjoining occupations according to the
ranking used in the tables (14 percent of the sample).24  Consistent with our expectations, the p-value on the
overidentification test moves from 0.0000 (Table 3) to 0.2776.  In other words, the overidentification restrictions can
no longer be rejected at standard significance levels.
Another possible source of misspecification is that, as mentioned in Section 2, we assume throughout the paper that
this period's wage is specified before production occurs. This, in essence, assumes away the presence of piece rate
                                                          
24 Note that except for clerical and service occupations, occupational mobility tends to be concentrated between
adjoining sectors.   There is a total of 11969 occupation transitions (34 percent of all observations) in the data.  Of
those 4789 are between "adjoining" occupation (i.e. between occupation 1 (professionals) and 2 (managers), 2 and 3
(sales), etc.).  Of the 7180 transitions among "non-adjoining" occupations, 5316 involve either clerical or service
occupations.  This pattern of transitions among occupations suggests that these two particular occupations are
difficult to rank in terms of an occupational hierarchy based on a single index of skills.
50
contracts or of any form of contracts where the level of pay is determined ex post, such as contracts where part of the
compensation is based on a subjective evaluation of performance. One consequence of having some workers in our
sample being paid piece rates or commissions would thus be to affect the validity of our overidentifying restrictions.
To explore whether this might be one reason why the restrictions are all rejected, we re-estimated our occupation
models by first restricting the sample to workers who were in occupations in which the percentage of piece rate
workers is below 10%. To impose this sample selection restriction, we looked at the percentage of workers in the
sample who are paid commissions or piece rates between 1988 and 1990, the three years in which this information is
available in the NLSY. We then exclude from our total sample observations that belong to one of the 3-digit
occupations where piece rates account for at least 10% of the observations between 1988 and 1990.25   As it turns
out, the overidentifying restrictions are still decidedly rejected, although the p-value does increase somewhat to
0.0003  for the model with comparative advantage only.26  There is hardly any change for the model with both
learning and comparative advantage.
If we further restrict the sample to occupations where piece rates account for less than 5% of the sample (this
reduces the sample size to 18,108 observations), we basically get the same results as in the previous paragraph for
the full sample: the overidentifying restrictions are rejected in both models. For the subsample of new jobs only,
though, both models pass the test, with a p-value of 0.2185 for the comparative advantage model and 0.0827 for the
model.
In summary, our assumptions that wages are paid in advance and depend on a single index of skill are restrictive and
clearly contribute to the rejection of the overidentification restrictions of the model.  It would be useful to enrich the
empirical model in future research to accommodate departures from these assumptions.  But despite the limitations
of our approach, we think our model and instrumentation strategy are a useful way of analyzing the role of
comparative advantage and learning in sectoral wage determination.
                                                          
25This reduces the sample size from to 24,726 observations. Not surprisingly, the main deletions are made in sales-
related occupations, where we are more likely to find workers paid commissions, and also among operatives, which
account for the bulk of piece rate workers.  A list of all deleted 3-digit occupations is available upon request.
26The improvement is more substantial if we look at new jobs. In fact, we cannot reject the restrictions (p-
value=0.0904) for the model with comparative advantage. The restrictions are still rejected for the full model with
learning and comparative advantage (p-value=0.0175).
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Appendix Table B1: Average Value of Log Wage in year t as a function of occupations in year t and t-1.
Occupation                           First lag of Occupation Categories
Categories
           Professional Managers    Sales     Clerical   Craft     Operatives  Services    Total
                                                         Workers   & laborers
Professional   0.30       0.36       0.26       0.07       0.18       0.02      -0.05       0.26
Managers       0.36       0.21       0.26       0.01       0.12      -0.16      -0.22       0.16
Sales          0.23       0.22       0.24      -0.09      -0.20      -0.35      -0.45       0.13
Clerical       0.05      -0.05      -0.14      -0.15      -0.10      -0.27      -0.41      -0.15
Craft workers  0.15       0.13      -0.12      -0.12       0.08      -0.09      -0.21       0.03
Operatives     0.01      -0.22      -0.25      -0.25      -0.11      -0.17      -0.39      -0.17
& Laborers
Services      -0.06      -0.26      -0.51      -0.45      -0.27      -0.39      -0.24      -0.26
 workers
Total          0.27       0.16       0.14      -0.13       0.03      -0.17      -0.25       0.00
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Appendix Table B2: Average Value of Log Wage in year t as a function of industry in year t and t-1.
                                                   First lag of Industry Categories
Industry       Mining,  Non-     Constr- Transpo.  FIRE   Bus&Prof Personal Wholesale Retail   Public    All
categories     Durables Durables uction  and util.        Services Services trade     trade    sector
Mining,         0.15     0.03    -0.05     0.15    0.09     0.24    -0.10     0.05    -0.21     0.24     0.11
 durables
Non-Durables    0.01    -0.03    -0.22    -0.08    0.03     0.02    -0.22    -0.08    -0.18    -0.05    -0.05
Construction   -0.05    -0.12     0.09     0.06   -0.01    -0.04    -0.15    -0.11    -0.18    -0.13     0.03
Transportation, 0.17     0.08    -0.04     0.20    0.17     0.10    -0.18    -0.09    -0.19     0.10     0.14
 Utilities
Fin., Insur.,   0.02    -0.12     0.00    -0.08    0.13     0.16    -0.33    -0.08    -0.22     0.05     0.10
 Real estate
Business and    0.21     0.02    -0.11     0.03    0.16     0.25    -0.18     0.01    -0.22     0.02     0.15
 Prof. Services
Personal       -0.18    -0.41    -0.16    -0.17   -0.40    -0.26    -0.26    -0.34    -0.38    -0.01    -0.28
 Services
Wholesale       0.05    -0.12    -0.19    -0.04   -0.11    -0.04    -0.30    -0.00    -0.22     0.01    -0.03
 trade
Retail Trade   -0.29    -0.31    -0.39    -0.23   -0.33    -0.24    -0.31    -0.29    -0.23    -0.25    -0.25
 trade
Public Sector  -0.01     0.05    -0.07     0.07    0.00     0.16    -0.05    -0.01    -0.08     0.19     0.14
All             0.10    -0.05     0.02     0.14    0.10     0.16    -0.25    -0.02    -0.23     0.15    -0.00
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